


























Abstract - During the Twentieth century, Italian joint-stock companies remained 
relatively small and tended to die young. This fact constrained the development of the 
full potential of the Italian industry, as small-dimensioned companies struggled to 
implement the most efficient technologies and managerial techniques. 
This paper analyses this problem by looking at the functioning of insolvency 
procedures. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence, we show how various 
devices that progressively appeared on the scene failed in providing efficient solutions 
to re-start worthy companies.  
Insolvency procedures thus remained liquidation-prone, a factor that contributes to 
explain the peculiarity and the limits of Italian industrial capitalism. 
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 SIZE, STRUCTURE, AND STRATEGIES: INSOLVENCY AND “THE NATURE OF 




In a seminal paper published eighty years ago, Coase explained that in its very nature 
‘the firm’ is not a mere instrument of production, rather a device for economic coordination to 
reduce the complexity and costs of ‘pure market’ exchanges.
2  Subsequent theoretical and 
empirical contributions in new institutional economics (NIE) pointed out that, in a world 
dominated by limited rationality and opportunistic behaviour, the essence of the ‘coesian’ 
firm is the development of ‘organisational capabilities’ defined as a set of mechanisms of 
coordination among economic agents and of diffusion of explicit and tacit knowledge.
3  
Historical studies, in particular the analysis of nineteenth-twentieth century American 
industrial capitalism, have shown that the development of firms along the lines of the NIE 
model is a long and complex process of interaction between technologies and markets on the 
one hand, and firms’ size, structure, and strategies on the other. Technological innovations 
open new markets requiring bigger scale of operation, driving a process that increases the 
firms’ size and leads to the development of more complex structures, in which the progressive 
rise of the importance of management (including middle management) parallels the decline of 
owners’ direct involvement.
 4 
More generally, the message of historical studies such as these is that, in order for 
companies to become ‘coesian’ firms, they need stability and time to grow in size, a 
precondition for the development of a structure able to generate ‘organisational capabilities’.  
These elements stand at odds with the Italian experience, where joint-stock companies 
remained smaller and the rate of birth/mortality higher than in other Western countries.
5 On 
the other hand, in the case of the few big corporations they either retained their ‘family’ 
structure or they were (often inefficiently) run by the state, and never fully developed into 
Chandler-style ‘visible hands’ of economic coordination.
6 In short, ‘firms’ as defined by the 
NIE failed to appear and the emergence of ‘organisational capabilities’ remained, to use 
Amatori’s words, a ‘tormented’ process.
7 This fact represented a severe constraint to the full 
development of the Italian industry and, as a consequence, of its entire economy. It is well 
documented that because of the nature of its joint-stock companies, Italy struggled to establish 
its permanent presence in high-technology industries, lagged behind the introduction of the 
most efficient managerial techniques, and was well behind other Western countries in terms 
of research and development.
8 Certainly the impressive success of export-oriented small and   2
medium family-owned firms managed to shadow these problems for most of the twentieth 
century, but as a consequence of industrial districts suffering from increasing competitions 
and the exhaustion of some of the elements of competitive advantages, these issues are 
surfacing again.  
This peculiarity of the Italian model has been the subject of numerous investigations 
focusing on a variety of elements, including the size of the domestic market, the role of the 
state, and the controversial relationship with the financial sector.
9 More in general, it can be 
said that explanations tend to converge towards the criticism of what can be defined as the 
‘institutional’ environment. Maybe surprisingly, in this debate not much attention has been 
paid to the functioning of legal institutions, in particular to commercial law, despite the 
evident impact that legislation and regulations might have on companies’ size, structure, and 
strategies.
10 This gap is even more surprising when we consider that in the analysis of the 
American case legal institutions such as the Anti-trust law played a critical role in the 
development of big business,
11 not to mention the fact that in the last two decades the role of 
legal institutions in fostering economic performance has been one of the most investigated 
topics in economics.
12  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the ‘nature of the firm’ in Italy by looking at the 
impact of the legal system, more specifically insolvency laws and procedures.
13 Besides other 
roles, these institutions perform the fundamental function of selecting, among firms in critical 
conditions, those to be liquidated from the ones that will be given a further chance. Also, it is 
the law’s task to provide the practical instruments for business’ re-launch. As insolvency is an 
ever-present phenomenon, very often caused by structural inefficiency and/or of fraudulent 
behaviour, but it is also the result of remediable problems, insolvency laws and practices play 
a key part in shaping the profile of the economy. More specifically a continuation-prone legal 
system, able to smooth the effect of the economy’s natural instability, should protect the 
process of firms’ growth and evolution along the lines of the NIE model.  
In this paper we test the hypothesis that Italian legal institutions were particularly badly 
equipped to deal with the problem of companies’ selection and re-start, de facto supporting 
business’ liquidation rather than continuation. Without aiming at downplaying other 
explanations provided by historiography, we argue that the functioning of insolvency laws 
and procedures contributes to explain the peculiar nature of Italian industrial capitalism. 
This study is based on both quantitative and qualitative sources. The former consist of 
macro national data on the number of cases involved in various procedures between 1900 and 
1980. Information about insolvent joint-stock companies in services and manufacturing
14 in   3
Milan and its province during the interwar period and the 1950s constitutes the bulk of 
qualitative sources. The choice to focus on Milan is motivated by the unique availability of 
detailed information about industrial insolvency during the 1920s and 1930s. During that 
period local normative obliged the Milan Chamber of Commerce to keep all documentation 
regarding failed companies, including detailed reports provided by curatori fallimentari.
15 
Although not all reports survived, this collection represents the richest source on the topic 
available in Italy.
 This is a particularly fortunate case, as Milan and the province were most 
important industrial area of the country, therefore well representative of the problem at a 
national level.  
The paper is structured as follows: section I analyses the evolution of the various legal 
instruments available in Italy in different periods. Section II provides a quantitative overview 
of bankruptcy and insolvency. Sections III to V run a qualitative analysis based on the results 
of section II. More specifically, section III looks at the limits of the tools available during the 
interwar period, section IV to the alternatives found to circumvent the inefficiency of official 
devices, while section V analyses whether or not new legal procedures developed in 1942 
changed the way in which Italian company dealt with the problem of insolvency. Section VI 
provides some concluding remarks. 
 
I 
In market economies insolvency and bankruptcy laws are pivotal institutions as they 
provide incentives (or constraints) to risk-taking, contribute to discipline debtors’ behaviour, 
and are structural components of the enforcement of credit contracts.
16 Ex post, insolvency 
rules also play the fundamental role of selecting between companies to be liquidated and the 
ones deserving a further chance, as well as providing the modality of such re-start. Regarding 
these specific issues, various bankruptcy instruments and practices can be grouped into three 
main typologies. In all legal systems, the most traditional device consists in the collection of 
the debtor’s assets, their sale on the market, and the distribution of the proceedings among 
claimants in proportion to their credits. This is a procedure that in Italy takes the name of 
fallimento (bankruptcy). By definition this mechanism is a pure credit-collection device and 
does not provide any solution to the problem of companies’ selection and restart. A variation 
on the same theme implies an agreement with creditors about a share of debts to be paid 
(composition or concordato fallimentare in Italian). In the case of personal bankruptcy this 
procedure eliminates the condition of ‘bankrupt’ allowing the debtor to re-enter the business   4
world, but as far as companies are concerned, compositions do not avoid their disappearance. 
Fallimento and concordato fallimentare have been in use in Italy since the oldest commercial 
code dating back to 1865. 
The second possible way to deal with insolvency consists of an agreement with 
creditors before the bankruptcy procedure takes place, an instrument that in Italian takes the 
name of concordato preventivo. These kinds of ex ante agreements provide the opportunity 
for companies to survive as long as they do not need to be liquidated in order for debtors to 
find enough financial resources to pay the agreed amount. This solution became available in 
Italy in 1903
17, and until 1942 it was the only formal instrument that could save insolvent 
firms, run by ‘honest but unlucky’ entrepreneurs, from liquidation. In their practical 
implementation, the ability of these agreements to avoid companies’ disappearance depends 
on two interrelated elements. Firstly, the level of the minimum share of debts that firms had to 
guarantee, ex-ante, to be able to pay in order for the court to approve the deal; the higher this 
threshold, the stronger the probability that a firm would had to liquidate to fulfil this criterion. 
Secondly, whether the option exists to transfer all the company’s assets as one single 
indivisible entity to creditors (cessione d’attivo). Apart form the immediate advantage of 
preserving firms’ integrity, this procedure also allows debtors to afford higher payments, as 
the value of an ongoing concern is usually higher than the market price of its components 
when sold separately. Thus cessione d’attivo, if available, might counterbalance the problem 
of the high minimum threshold of debts re-payment, making more firms eligible for 
compositions with creditors. On the basis of these issues, the Italian procedures look 
particularly badly suited to facilitate firms’ survival. In fact, until a reform passed in 1930,
 in 
Italy debtors filing for concordato preventivo had to guarantee the payment of at least forty 
per cent of all unsecured debts, the highest threshold in the Western world.
18 On the other 
hand the cessione d’attivo remained legally impossible in Italy for longer than in other 
systems.
19 
The third general way to deal with insolvency implies the declaration of debt 
moratorium. This might be associated to the replacement of management and/or to the 
provision of a re-launch program. It goes without saying that the latter condition is crucial in 
ensuring the company’s survival, unless problems are either temporary or superficial enough 
to be automatically solved by the mere appointment of new management. In the case of the 
provision of a re-starting plan, it is also of fundamental importance to have a procedure able 
to lock-in possible reluctant creditors.
20 In the Italian system, the first form of moratorium 
appeared in 1882 but it was abolished in 1903 as a result of its disappointing performance.   5
This tool, in fact, remained a purely theoretical option, as it allowed only debtors whose assets 
exceeded liabilities to file for it. In 1942 a new procedure called amministrazione controllata 
arrived on the scene.
21 In this case a yearlong moratorium was associated to the appointment 
of a new management whose members were chosen among public officers. Conditions for 
filing for amministrazione controllata were not as strict as for the previous moratorium but, 
interestingly, court approval did not depend (at least according to the formal character of the 
law) upon an analysis of technical competences, managerial ability, and more in general on 
the future viability of the company.
22 Furthermore, this institution did not contemplate any 
specific directives on how to solve the crisis, other than the generic (and optimistic) 
assumption that problems would be solved in one year by the new management. Finally, in 
contrast with the American and English procedures, the law provided no incentive for 
investors to re-capitalise the company and to give it a real ‘fresh start’.  
Although not necessarily part of the official procedures, a fourth possible solution to 
insolvency can be found in voluntary liquidation. This is largely a preventive strategy, as 
voluntary liquidation is in general allowed only to solvent firms that can prove to be 
potentially able to pay all debts.
23 Recourse to voluntary liquidation helps to keep firms alive 
only in the case in which it is statutorily linked to a re-starting plan; in other words, once the 
company is liquidated an attempt must be made to use all its assets to reconstitute another 
firm. Having a statutory restructuring clause, however, is only a necessary condition for 
voluntary liquidation to be turned into a continuation-prone device, but it is by no means a 
sufficient one. In fact, as in the case of moratorium, a further issue regards the ability of the 
institutional mechanisms surrounding liquidation to lock-in potentially reluctant creditors. 
These two problems, for example, were explicitly addressed in the English case.
24 Under the 
Italian law voluntary liquidation was granted to any company formally able to guarantee the 
payment of all debts. Furthermore, in circumstances where companies had lost more than one 
third of their capital, the Italian commercial code obliged them to choose between re-
capitalisation and liquidation.
 25 However, no restructuring plan was required to file for 
voluntary liquidation, and creditors not only had no legal incentive or constrain to support the 
re-launch plan (if any was put forward), but actually any single creditor had the right to 
declare the company bankrupt at any stage of the voluntary liquidation process if the firm 
failed to meet a debt of any size.  
 To sum-up, the Italian legislation seems to have had serious limitation in terms of its 
ability to guarantee companies’ continuation. Although the instruments provided were not 
dissimilar from the ones available in other countries, idiosyncratic features might have made   6
the alternatives to liquidation either complicated to obtain or ineffective. Using both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence in the next three sections we will test this hypothesis. 
 
II 
In this section we analyse the relative degree of adoption of the various procedures – 
fallimento (including concordato fallimentare), concordato preventivo and amministrazione 
controllata – that companies could use when facing insolvency problems. 
Graph 1 shows that the number of fallimenti moved to its peak during the big crisis of 
late Twenties reaching its all-time pitch in 1931 (13,102 cases). The number of fallimenti then 
began to decrease. It must be noted that during both World Wars the amount of these 
procedures was extremely low, particularly during World War II when it reached its minimum 
level (91 in 1944). This result is probably due to the stagnation of economic activity during 
wartime, and in particular to the general inefficiency and inactivity of the legal bodies in 
charge of the administration of bankruptcy and insolvency procedures. Thus, the observed 
peak in the number of fallimenti in the post-wars years is partially explained by the re-staring 
of court proceedings. 
Graph 1. Number of fallimenti (1901-1980) 
 
Sources: our own elaborations on Istat, Annuario [various years].   7
 
It is worth noticing that in the period under investigation the number of fallimenti shows 
no linear relationship with economic fluctuations. On one hand, during the downturn of the 
Thirties the number of procedures increased, confirming the inverse relation between the 
amount of fallimenti and the economic cycle. On the other hand, however, during the crises of 
the Seventies the number of fallimenti  did not rise, as one would expect. A possible 
explanation of this mismatch can be linked to the character of firms’ demography, taking into 
account that in a period of crisis it is possible to expect a lower level of birth of new firms. 
Since relatively younger (and smaller) companies were particularly prone to become 
insolvent
26, this means that during crises the segment of firms’ population more exposed to 
this problem was smaller, even if the average probability of insolvency increased in general. 
As a consequence the link between macroeconomic performance and insolvency is weakened. 
As far as the relative use of different procedures is concerned, Graph 2 and Table 1 
show that fallimento (bankruptcy) was the most wide-spread device during the whole period, 
representing more than ninety per cent of total cases, notwithstanding the introduction of 
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Graph 2. Percentage of concordato preventivo and amministrazione controllata on total 
procedures (1901-1980) 
 
Sources: our own elaborations on Istat, Annuario  [various years]. 
 
During the first few years after its appearance on the scene, concordato preventivo 
accounted for about 4 per cent of total procedures, but in the following period its use 
decreased considerably. The introduction of amministrazione controllata in 1942 did not alter 
this picture either. During the Forties and the Fifties, fallimenti accounted for about 98 per 
cent of the total procedures, while concordato preventivo and amministrazione controllata 
made up, together, only the remaining 2 per cent. Their use began to grow only at the end of 
the Seventies when the two procedures together made up about ten per cent of the total. This 
seems to show that neither of the new procedures was able to reach the aims for which they 
had been introduced. The analysis of the data also shows that amministrazione controllata was 
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Tab. 1 Average number of concordato preventivo,  fallimento, and amministrazione 







1901-1905 94  2,427   
1906-1910 65  2,209   
1911-1915 76  3,973   
1916-1920 6  672   
1921-1925 105  5,011   
1926-1930 245  10,701   
1931-1935 281  10,289   
1936-1940 42  3,555   
1941-1945 3  440  - 
1946-1950  25 3,007 23 
1951-1955  53 6,600 35 
1956-1960  58 7,590 37 
1961-1965  60 6,450 53 
1966-1970 137  7,210  59 
1971-1975 123  5,084  61 
1976-1980 243  5,294  148 
 
Total average  102  5,126  61 
Sources: our own elaborations on Istat, Annuario [various years]. 
 
Another important point that emerges from the analysis concerns joint-stock companies. 
As we can see in Graph 3, during the whole period, the percentage of joint-stock companies 
that used any official procedure was very low, remaining below the threshold of the 1 per cent 
of the total. In other words, officially only less than 1 in one hundred companies in the 
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Graph 3. Quota of joint-stock companies using various insolvency procedures on the 
total population of Italian joint-stock companies (1947-1979) 
 
Sources: our own elaborations on Istat, Annuario [various years]. 
 
As far as the different procedures are concerned, joint-stock companies mainly used 
fallimento, and the quota of businesses filing for concordato preventivo and amministrazione 
controllata accounted for 0.1 per cent of the total companies’ population. These data show 
that for joint-stock companies all procedures plaid a marginal role.  
Data disaggregated in terms of typology of debtor are available only since 1947 (Graph 
4). The comparison between graph 4 and graph 2 shows that joint-stock companies made 
recourse to concordato preventivo and amministrazione controllata differently as compared to 
other kind of businesses. Even if for joint-stock companies the quota of fallimenti on total 
procedures still prevailed (79 per cent in average during the period), the percentages of 
concordato preventivo and amministrazione controllata were considerably higher (11.9 per 
cent the former and the 9.4 per cent the latter in average during the period) than in the sample 
including all types of businesses. In the Seventies in particular, for joint-stock companies the 
quota of the sum of these two procedures seems to become stable around twenty-five per cent 
of total procedures. 
   11
Graph 4. Joint-stock companies: percentage of concordato preventivo and 
amministrazione controllata on total procedures (1947-1980) 
 
 
Sources: our own elaborations on Istat, Annuario [various years]. 
 
This suggests that the use of amministrazione controllata as a tool to avoid fallimento 
and to allow firms continuing in business varied widely amongst different types of businesses 
(Graph 5). In particular, we can note a negligible use (0.4 per cent on total on average) of 
these procedures for the ditte individuali (sole ownership) and the so-called società di fatto 
(irregular companies)
 particularly prone to use fallimento (98.7 per cent on average). This is 
typical for small firms that were more exposed to failure either in a start up phase or as a 
natural solution to the problem of inheritance in case of death of the owner of the business. 
The use of this procedure was also marginal (1.8 per cent on total on average) for the so-
called società regolari
27 that filed for fallimento in the 95.2 per cent on cases. On the other 
hand, joint-stock companies had a wider usage of amministrazione controllata (9.4 per cent on 
average) and a lower use of fallimento (78.7 per cent on average) than any other kind of 
businesses.    12
Graph 5. Distribution (in percentage) of different kind of businesses using 
amministrazione controllata (1947-1980) 
 
Sources: our own elaborations on Istat, Annuario [various years]. 
 
Tosum-upe, the analysis suggests that fallimento and concordato fallimentare were and 
remained by far the most widespread procedures. Their alternatives found, in general, 
relatively little use, although they proved to be much more popular among joint-stock 
companies (twenty per cent on average) than among any other type of firms. On the one hand, 
however, only a very small number of joint-stock companies got involved in any kind of 




The quantitative analysis thus points out that Italian joint-stock companies made very 
little recourse to official procedures and, when this happened, they tended to use credit-
collection devices such as fallimento rather than re-starting mechanisms such as concordato 
preventivo. These results generate two questions. The first one is why, among official 
devices, re-launch-oriented procedures were underused. The second issue is whether the very 
low number of joint-stock companies filing for any kind of official procedures must be seen   13
as a sign of high stability or, in fact, only hides the fact that unofficial devices were used 
instead. If this were the case, we must also investigate which kind of extra-judicial solutions 
existed and the way they functioned. 
In order to answer these questions, we use qualitative information about various 
companies that in the period under analysis faced insolvency problems. In this section and in 
the next one we focus on the interwar period (when concordato preventivo was the only 
alternative to fallimento), while section V addresses the post 1942 period to see whether or 
not the introduction of amministrazione concordata changed the picture. 
The qualitative analysis is mainly based on information from the archive of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Milan, in particular the section denominated ‘Imprese fallite e 
relazione dei curatori fallimentari’ (shortly, ACCM/If.). The ACCM/If sample contains 
information about the joint-stock companies that went insolvent in Milan and its province 
between 1922 and 1935. Out of the two hundred and fifty-six cases, information exceeding 
just the name of the company and the year of insolvency are available for one hundred and 
fifty-three companies including, in some cases, the reports written by the curatore fallimentare 
which provides extensive and detailed description on the history of the company, the causes 
of insolvency, the capital structure, and the outcome of the procedure. While ACCM/If 
provides the bulk of the information, two other sources are used as a complement. The first 
one is the Bollettino Ufficiale delle Società per Azioni (shortly BUSA) which is the official 
Italian bulletin of limited-liability companies. This source lists yearly (desegregated by 
provinces) the names of companies that ceased to exist, and for some of the firms also 
provides an extremely summarised description of the circumstances under which they 
disappeared.
 The other source comes from the section of the archive of the Milan Chamber of 
Commerce called Archivio Ditte (shortly, ACCM/Ad). It contains files relative to individual 
firms recording all major changes such as liquidation, bankruptcy, merger to or acquisition by 
other companies, and so on. Unfortunately information from ACCM/Ad is much less detailed 
and precise than the one provided by ACCM/If, and often available only for a limited number 
of cases. 
Starting with the outcome of procedures, the analysis of the ACCM/If sample provides 
results in line with the national trend (Table 2). Bankruptcy (ordinary fallimento) was by far 
the most widespread procedure, leaving to concordato preventivo only a very marginal role. It 
must be noticed that among bankruptcies there were a few examples of proved frauds leading 
to bancarotta fraudolenta,
 a share of concordati fallimentari, and some cases that were closed   14
via the so-called insufficienza d’attivo, a specific procedure conceived to deal with companies 
whose remaining assets were not even enough to cover the legal fees. 
 






















    
2 6  110 5  18  4  145 2 6  153
Note: * of which 17 declared and 1 suggested. 
Source: ACCM/If. 
 
At first glance, the very marginal role played by concordato preventivo would induce us 
to believe that the large majority of insolvent firms in Milan were not in the position of 
successfully filing for it, either because of their desperate conditions (and therefore unable to 
guarantee the payment of the required minimum percentage of debts), or because the cause of 
the insolvency did not fit the legal principle of being ‘honest but unlucky’.  
A deeper analysis, however, reveals that a number of formal and substantial 
requirements made concordato preventivo extremely hard to reach even for companies that 
were neither desperate nor fraudulent. The first problem was that, for most of the period under 
study, the ex ante legal minimum percentage of debts that companies had to guarantee to be 
able to pay was very high (forty per cent), a problem that generates a very strong selection 
amongst potential applicants. Looking for example at the seventeen cases of concordato 
fallimentare for which evidence is available, we can see that, apart from 4 cases, all other 
companies paid a share of debts equal or higher than twenty-five per cent, the threshold that 
was necessary in England to file for deeds of arrangement, the equivalent of the Italian 
concordato preventivo. In other words, there was a pool of companies that in another legal 
system could have been able to benefit from more lenient instruments. The problem, however, 
was more complicated than that, as being able to pay ex post a given share of debts was 
different from being in the position of ex-ante guaranteeing a given amount of payment. This 
could be a reason why even companies that at the end of various procedures paid a share of 
debts equal or above 40 per cent or even the full amount, did not file for (or did not obtain) 
concordato preventivo.
28    15
The guarantee of a high minimum statutory payment was far from being the only or 
main difficulty in getting concordato preventivo. According to the law, applicants had to pass 
a double independent screening by the court first, and then by creditors. These two stages 
were completely independent from each other as proved by cases in which creditors turned 
down deals already approved by the court, also when extra guarantees were provided.
29 On 
top of the problem of passing two different and independent assessments, companies filing for 
concordato preventivo had to deal with procedures that were formally complicated and 
suffered from lack of correct information and coordination among decision-makers. At courts’ 
level, the complexity of the formal requirements could be already enough to discourage 
potential applicants.
30 An even more significant problem than the complexity of the 
procedures was the substantial partiality and lack of information that characterised the 
decision making process. Because of the functioning of the procedure, the commissario 
giudiziale
 - the person in charge of writing the report that courts used to decide on whether or 
not grant concordato preventivo - could use a much more limited amount of information that 
the one available to the curatore fallimentare - the person that managed the bankruptcy 
procedure.
31 In practice it seems that in the Italian procedure much more attention was 
dedicated to the analysis of the case after the declaration of bankruptcy than before. This is 
something that, for example, did not happen in England (at least in case of personal 
bankruptcy), where the same report was both used before bankruptcy (to allow or disallow a 
deed of arrangement) and after it (for example in deciding about the debt-discharge). Similar 
problems of partial information, complicated by issues of coordination, also surfaced at the 
level of creditors’ scrutiny; by operating in the alleged maximisation of personal interest, 
single creditors often failed to foresee the best actual opportunities, with the result that the 
wide-majority-based procedures meant incredible obstacles to reach concordato preventivo 
even for worthy business. This problem is well emphasised in the case of the company 
Fonderia di Desio, able to offer a friendly agreement on the basis of the payment of fifty per 
cent of debts, a deal turned down because blind and uncoordinated self-interested creditors 
(‘everyone is looking after their own interest’, as the curatore fallimentare stated in his report) 
expected to get a higher percentage of credits re-payment via the bankruptcy procedure. As a 
result, the company was pushed into bankruptcy, but the curatore fallimentare made it clear 
that it would be ‘impossible’ to expect a percentage of payment ‘close to the one offered 
during concordato’.
32  
From the analysis conducted above it appears that filing for and obtaining concordato 
preventivo was in general a very complicated affair. A further, and probably even more   16
significant problem is that these difficulties applied to all types of companies, well run and 
potentially innovative as well as fraudulent, innovative and entrepreneurial as well as 
conservative. In other words, it seems that the function of virtuous selection among 
companies, fundamental in any pro re-start insolvency norm or practice, was very badly 
performed by concordato preventivo. Neither the formal requirement of the law, which was 
based on the combination of the fuzzily defined principles of ‘bad luck and honesty’, nor 
judges’ behaviour ensured a preferential treatment to potentially viable and/or innovative 
firms. Evidence of this problem can be inferred by looking at the level of viability and 
innovativeness and of the companies in the ACCM/If sample. Table 3 provides a breakdown 
of the sample according to the causes of insolvency and on this basis divides between 
unviable and viable businesses. The former category includes companies, whose insolvency 
was caused by purely fraudulent/speculative behaviour from the very beginning, by frauds 
committed during normal activity, by structural inefficiency leading to the inability to 
compete on the market, including when such inefficiency depended on sector crisis. The latter 
is composed by companies that operated in potentially successful markets in which they could 
competitively sell goods or services, but that were pushed into insolvency by bankruptcy of 
their own debtors, lack of capital, mismanagement, exogenous short-term shocks, or a 
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Tab. 3 Insolvency in Milan by causes (1922-1935) 
Bankruptcy of debtors  1 
Bankruptcy of debtors/lack of capital/mismanagement  2 
External shocks  1 
Lack of capital  9 
Lack of capital/mismanagement  6 
Mismanagement 7 






Total viable  27 
Fraud 4 
Fraud/lack of market  1 
Fraud/structural inefficiency.  1 
Lack of capital/lack of market  2 
Lack of capital/lack of market/mismanagement  4 
Lack of capital/mismanagement/sector crisis.  2 
Lack of capital/sector crisis  1 
Lack of market   9 
Lack of market/mismanagement  1 
Lack of market/Structural inefficiency  3 
Mismanagement/fraud 1 
Purely speculative/sham/fraudulent  25 
Sector crisis  4 
Sector crisis/structural inefficiency  2 












Total unviable  96 
Unknown causes  29 




Total unknown  30 
Total sample    153 
Source: ACCM/If. 
 
The rational for such categorization is that firms in the latter category had the potential 
to be successful once re-capitalised and/or the management was replaced. Even if this 
desegregation is somehow arbitrary, still the evidence suggested a remarkable disproportion 
between the number of potentially viable companies (27) and the number of concordati 
preventivi allowed (2).   18
A similar test has been run by considering the sector of activity and dividing the sample 
between the companies involved in innovative activities from others operating in traditional 
fields.
33 Table 4 shows that the number of innovative companies in the sample is not 
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Tab. 4 Insolvency in Milan by level of innovativeness (1922-1935) 
Innovative Chemical   6 
Development of patents  1 
Electric engineering  9 
Pharmaceutical   2 
Filmmaking 3 
Innovative mechanical engineering  5 
Mechanical/electrical engineering  2 













Building/estate agency  3 
Traditional chemical   1 
Entertainment/Tourism 10 
Estate agent  2 









Retail trade  14 
Shoemaking 1 
Special cases  1 
Textile 17 
Retail and wholesale trade  6 
Transport 2 


















  Tot. Traditional  111 
Unknown    9 
Tot. sample    153 
Source: ACCM/If.   20
 
These results suggest that at the aggregate level variables such as innovativeness or 
future viability played a minor role, and qualitative analysis supports this view. The company 
Giglio, for example, was a  very innovative company, almost the stereotype of the 
‘Schumpeterian’ model, as in the early 1920s it first produced a prototype of side lights for 
cars. Despite the unquestionable validity of the product, the market proved not to be ready 
yet, and the company was pushed into bankruptcy, without even the benefit of concordato 
preventivo.
34 It is also interesting the case of the Società Anonima Combustibili 
35 which was 
condemned to bankruptcy even if its insolvency was largely due to an external, unavoidable, 
short-term shock such as the crisis of the Banca Italiana di Sconto
36. More in general, the 
analysis of the only two surviving records of court decisions on whether to grant concordato 
preventivo also supports the view that issues of innovativeness or viability were not taken into 
account. In the case of the company De Capitani & F.lli for example the court was very strict 
in looking at the guarantees provided and the modality of payment, but these were the only 
criteria considered. There is no mention of the possibility or convenience of re-launching the 
company, or of the fact that its actual difficulties were largely linked to one single debtor 





Section III shows the problems that even potentially viable companies faced in filing for 
concordato preventivo. This contributes to explain why, among official procedures, fallimento 
remained by far the most used one. On the other hand, the fact that these tools were so badly 
conceived and implemented can also explain why so few companies used any kind of official 
procedure at all.
38 If this were the case, it is also relevant to investigate the extent (if any) to 
which unofficial solutions were used, and whether they represented a better alternative, in 
particular in terms of allowing companies to restart. The first step of this analysis is to provide 
a rough estimate of the ratio between the amount of companies stopping their activity and the 
actual number of official insolvency procedures. In the case of Milan this is possible by 
comparing information from the BUSA sample (which for every year provides the list of 
companies which interrupted their activity disaggregated by province) to information from 
ACCM/If about the number of firms that every year used official insolvency procedures. 
Focusing on the benchmark year 1924, the BUSA indicates that one hundred and sixteen   21
joint-stock companies exited the market in Milan and the province, but according to the 
ACCM/If only twelve cases of insolvency had been declared. Even taking into account that 
among the hundred and sixteen cases reported by the BUSA, 2 joint-stock companies 
disappeared to be re-created as partnerships, 8 businesses reached the end of their expected 
life or were just branches of other companies, and 6 of them were banks or insurance 
companies that have not been included in the ACCM/If sample, still the discrepancy is 
noticeable.  
It is evident therefore that joint-stock companies looked for alternatives to the official 
procedures provided by law using, in particular, voluntary liquidation. In theory the use of 
voluntary liquidation is a perfectly legitimate strategy for firms that, facing difficulties and 
having no prospect of re-launch, decide to put an anticipated end to their life before running 
into further trouble. In Italy, however, the peculiar harshness and inefficiency of official 
insolvency procedures could have generated the tendency to rush into liquidation even in 
cases in which companies were in the position of trying to defend their business or 
restructuring and starting again, with the result that potentially viable and successful 
companies found a premature death. In this regard it is particularly revealing that companies, 
sometimes successfully, often tried to find an agreement with creditors only after that first 
attempt to liquidate failed.
39  
To some extent the rush into liquidation was also the result of the already-mentioned 
norm of the commercial code, which imposed to firms that had lost one third of their capital, 
either to re-capitalise or to liquidate. Evidence of the frequency of this problem can be 
inferred from the BUSA sample for 1924, where cases of companies that decided to liquidate 
because of the inability to raise new capital on the market are easy to find.
40 Although this 
problem is clearly linked also to the working of the Italian credit market, therefore outside the 
scope of this paper,
41 it also sheds light on the fact that the Italian procedure did not 
contemplate any mechanism to make the re-financing of a potentially viable company an 
alternative more appealing than its liquidation. In particular, while in England and the US 
voluntary wind-up was often the first step towards restructuring via specific legal procedures, 
also conceived to counterbalance the action of a minority of reluctant creditors, in Italy 
restructuring was allowed, but it was not protected by any specific legal device. This again led 
to the disappearance of potentially viable companies. The Società Elettrotecnica is a good 
example.
42 It was put into liquidation in 1924 and terminated the procedure in 1930. Since 
1928 administrators foresaw the possibility of future new business and decided to temporarily 
suspend liquidation, in order to keep current activity to a minimum, and to wait for the   22
moment to present a restructuring plan. The pursuit of this strategy however had to be 
interrupted because the company found it impossible to find an agreement to procrastinate the 
payment of already-due taxes. In practice it was the state that, operating as an ordinary 
creditor, created an insurmountable obstacle to attempt the company’s re-launch.  
The absence of norms constraining creditors’ action meant not only that the option of 
restarting became rather complicated, but also that embarking on voluntary wind-up did not 
protect at all against the possibility of the company being pushed into bankruptcy anyway. 
The law established that during liquidation any unsatisfied creditor (even a single one) could 
declare the company bankrupt if it failed to meet any liability. This problem did not only 
concern relatively unstable companies, but also sound ones were exposed to it, as liquidation 
was often a long and complicated procedure open to risks of all kind, in particular to severe 
devaluation of assets price. A measure of the extent of the problem can be inferred from the 
ACCM/If sample in which thirty-one companies became bankrupt during the liquidation 
process. Even if the majority of these companies had structural problems, having therefore 
little expectation of avoiding bankruptcy in any case, some of them were not so troubled. 
Examples can be found of firms pushed into bankruptcy despite having started the liquidation 
process with a level of assets exceeding the nominal value of liabilities, sometimes because of 
the action of one single creditor.
43 Particularly revealing is the case of the company 
Federazione Casearia Italiana, whose successful liquidation turned into bankruptcy because of 





The analysis in sections III and IV indicates that neither official procedures nor informal 
alternatives were well equipped to successfully address the problem of companies’ re-starting. 
On the one hand, official devices such as concordato preventivo were hard to achieve, were 
not linked to considerations about innovativeness or viability, and scarcely connected with 
companies’ restart anyway. Voluntary liquidation was not an efficient alternative without any 
automatic link to re-starting plan and the possibility to limit creditors’ power.  
In 1942 a specific formal device called amministrazione controllata was provided with 
the explicit aim of addressing the problem of avoiding the disappearance of potentially viable 
companies. As stressed in section I the new institution was based upon the principle of the 
replacement of management in the expectation that this would be enough to solve companies’   23
crisis. In the light of the argument of this paper, the questions to answer are firstly, whether or 
not the new institution was a viable alternative to concordato preventivo and fallimento (i.e. 
how simple it was to use it) and secondly, if a company managed to obtain it, the extent to 
which amministrazione controllata represented a better solution to the problem of re-starting. 
The first point can be addressed initially by reconsidering the result of the quantitative 
analysis, which showed that although amministrazione controllata proved to be much more 
popular among joint-stock companies than among any other type of business, in quantitative 
terms it usage never really took-off.  
Qualitative analysis is made hard by the fact that very little direct evidence, if any at all, 
can be found about the reasons why and the conditions under which companies decided to file 
for amministrazione controllata, or the way in which applications were analysed by courts. In 
fact, information from BUSA is extremely sketchy, while no case of application for 
amministrazione controllata has been found when looking at cases from the ACCM/Ad 
sample. A way of bypassing this problem is to use a counterfactual argument by looking at 
the problems companies faced before 1942 and asking ‘what if’ amministrazione controllata 
had existed at the time. This institution relied mainly on management replacement, and 
certainly mismanagement was a very widespread cause of insolvency during the interwar 
years. The analysing of the ACCM/If sample shows that mismanagement was the sole or 
main cause in 7 cases of insolvency, and played a part in other eighteen examples (Table 3). 
Often companies that suffered from mismanagement were potentially successful businesses 
operating in buoyant markets.
45 If we exclude the circumstances where mismanagement was 
also in conjunction with fraud or other causes of structural inefficiency, in the other cases 
amministrazione controllata, if it had existed at the time, would have been a good solution.  
The other issue that must be considered in assessing the potential appeal of 
amministrazione controllata, is that management replacement made sense only for companies 
with a clear distinction between ownership and control and with effective managers’ 
independency. This was certainly not the rule in the ACCM/If sample in which a large 
number of companies appear to be small and without a real professional management, often 
being just small partnerships or even sole ownerships only formally transformed into limited-
liability corporations. As Table 5 suggests, a large number of companies just reached the 
threshold of ten thousands lira of capital, an amount judged ‘laughable’ by a contemporary 
receiver.
46 On top of this, even among bigger companies there were other twelve cases of 
either purely made-up capital, or circumstances where no real management-property   24
distinction could be drawn. This problem per se simply disallowed a significant share of 
companies from filing for amministrazione controllata. 
 
Table 5. Insolvency in Milan by size (1922-1935)  
(Nominal capital in thousands Lira)  
 
Size 


















companies  33 31  64  13 18 16  5  14  23  153 
Source: ACCM/If. 
 
Apart from the extent of its application, a further problem is whether or not 
amministrazione controllata, when used, gave better results that concordato preventivo or 
liquidazione volontaria in terms of allowing good companies to restart. In this case, too, direct 
qualitative evidence is hard to get, but a counterfactual analysis can be run. One major 
problem that constrained firms’ restart was undercapitalisation and the necessity to lock-in 
creditors in the process of re-launch; cases of potentially successful companies needed an 
injection of fresh financial resources have been found in the ACCM/If sample.
47 However, 
amministrazione controllata provided no solution at all to these problems. 
Not surprisingly, the two issues of small size on the one hand, and the need for the 
injection of new financial resources on the other, were strictly connected. As a matter of fact, 
the vast majority of small companies, whose size and structure made management 
replacement nonsense, were also most likely victims of undercapitalisation and most of them 
needed new credit resources to re-start. Small businesses just matched the legal threshold in 
terms of net worth and had to rely massively on short-term external financing. This structure 
made companies particularly vulnerable to cyclical or exogenous shocks and, even when 
viable, particularly exposed to the action of creditors. Among various cases taken-down in the 
ACCM/If sample, the firm Edizioni Pervinca is a particularly revealing example of a small 
and undercapitalised company for which the existence of amministrazione controllata would 
have made no difference. Edizioni Pervinca was a successful business but lacked net worth 
and relied massively on short-term commercial credit (up to about ten times the capital). 
When short-term problems arose in the form of a deep disagreement between two major   25
stockholders, the company entered a phase of crisis and proved unable to cope with pressure 
from various creditors.
48 
To conclude, when tested against the real problems faced by insolvent firms, 
amministrazione controllata appears to be a poor alternative to concordato preventivo, in 
terms of both applicability and its actual ability to re-launch companies. It was probably 
adequate to address issues of mismanagement in big corporations, but useless for small 
companies and completely unequipped to tackle problems of creditors lock-in. 
 
VI 
During the twentieth century Italian joint-stock companies remained small and died 
young, struggling to develop into ‘coesian’ firms. The difficult rise of companies with fully 
developed organisational capabilities meant lags and limitations in the introduction of the 
most advanced technologies and managerial techniques and, more in general, an artificial 
constraint to the development of the full potential of the Italian industrial sectors. 
This paper shows that the functioning of insolvency and bankruptcy laws and 
procedures can be included among the causes of this problem. Despite being formally similar 
to the ones existing in other systems, in Italy various legal devices available to deal with 
corporate failure were inadequate in their function of selecting among companies and 
providing efficient re-launch mechanisms. In its practical implementation the system was and 
remained liquidation-prone, and insolvency, the result of either natural cyclical fluctuations or 
of exceptional crisis, took a disproportionate toll on the Italian industrial system. 
Before 1942 concordato preventivo was the only official procedure that contemplated, 
at least on paper, the possibility of avoiding liquidation and to allow companies to re-start. 
Data show that this institution was rarely used, and qualitative analysis reveals that this was 
due to the strictness and formal complications of the criteria to be fulfilled in order to obtain 
it. The study of archival sources also shows that innovative or viable companies did not get 
any preferential treatment.  
The general inefficiency of concordato preventivo (and the strictness of fallimento) 
pushed companies to search for alternatives, found in the large, and often premature, use of 
voluntary liquidation. This solution, however, was no better alternative to concordato 
preventivo in terms of re-launching potentially viable companies, as voluntary liquidation was 
not, as in the American or English system, automatically linked to a re-starting plan, nor it 
provided any defence against the action of reluctant creditors, even when a large majority   26
agreed. As a consequence voluntary liquidation led to the disappearance of companies, often 
via the use of ordinary insolvency.  
In 1942 Italian lawmakers for the first time provided a procedure (amministrazione 
controllata) explicitly conceived to address the problem of insolvent yet viable businesses. 
Data shows that this new tool made little impact in general, although it proved to be relatively 
more popular among joint-stock companies. Amministrazione controllata addressed the issue 
of mismanagement in big businesses (indeed an important part of the problem), but it was no 
solution for the plethora of relatively smaller companies that constituted the large majority of 
cases of corporate insolvency. The key issue of locking-in creditors in the process of firm’s 
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